Thursday, February 17, 2011

Britian's NHS

Jan 13th Edition of The Economist


Health-care reform

The final frontier

Of all the government’s public-service reforms, its bid to reshape the National Health Service may prove the most painful

Jan 13th 2011 | Print Edition


ONE of the problems governments face in attempting to reform health care is that the National Health Service (NHS) is a symbol as well as a service. Nigel Lawson, a former Conservative chancellor, observed that England only had one national religion: the NHS. The coalition agreement signed last May by the Tories and Liberal Democrats described the NHS as “an important expression of our national values”. Meddling with it can be dangerous—as the coalition is discovering.

Whereas the Conservatives’ plans for welfare and education reform were described in their election manifesto, the ongoing shake-up of the NHS was not. As it turned out, Andrew Lansley, now the Tory health secretary, was stealthily working on a plan for major reforms. He proposes to dissolve both Primary Care Trusts, which commission hospital care on behalf of GPs (family doctors), and Strategic Health Authorities, regional organisations that issue guidance and directives about expenditure. Instead, GP practices will be obliged to form consortia to commission care themselves. European competition law will ensure a level playing field between public and private providers.

This is a big shift, but not a wholly original one. Margaret Thatcher initiated the division between the purchasers of hospital care (local doctors commissioning services for patients) and providers (usually large hospitals). The new plan revives a Tory experiment of the early 1990s, which placed budgets at the disposal of some GPs.

The arguments for it look strong. The budget of the NHS in England (health care in other parts of Britain is organised separately) ballooned in the boom years to £104 billion ($164 billion), and is protected from the spending cuts affecting most other government departments. Yet David Nicholson, the NHS’s chief executive, has estimated that the service faces a shortfall of up to £20 billion in the next three years. To meet increased demand, NHS productivity—which has remained static since 1997—needs to rise by 4% per year. Already the financial strain is showing. A shortage of flu vaccine in a cold January looked like a harbinger of shortages ahead. The Royal College of Midwives has warned that it is dangerously short-staffed when it comes to delivering little Britons. In theory the reforms will save money, by cutting administrative costs and giving GPs more incentive to spend wisely.

And the NHS is still widely variable in outcomes, as well as in efficiency. Some GPs embrace the task of chivvying specialists for better and quicker care for their patients; some do not. The new arrangements might oblige the slacker ones to be more engaged. Meanwhile, Mr Lansley’s bid to extend choice among providers will involve publishing more transparent data on clinical performance—long viewed by hospitals and consultants with suspicion, but an advance for patients in making decisions about where they are treated.

Predictably, the health secretary faces formidable opposition. Medical practitioners are prodigious and well-organised complainers—and skilled in persuading voters that their interests are aligned.

Spokesmen for family doctors say they do not wish to become administrators—to which the government replies that it is happy for GP practices to appoint others to bargain with providers on their behalf, and to switch to new intermediaries if they find the results unsatisfactory. Another doubt is whether the breakneck pace that Mr Lansley envisages—all GP practices will be required to be part of consortia by 2013—will create problems of its own.

Pick your battles

Sarah Wollaston, a doctor and since last year a Conservative MP, has warned Mr Lansley that the threatened speedy dissolution of existing structures is causing staff to quit, just at the time when experience of commissioning will be at a premium. Doctors are also concerned about the legal framework of consortia and the possibility of financial failures.

The suddenness of the changes, and fears about the accountability of the new organisations, disturb even some who are broadly supportive. Opponents also worry that private providers could undercut existing public ones, in effect running loss-leader services to drive others out of business. In response, Mr Lansley offers a robust defence of deregulation and its benefits to consumers, based on his experience in helping the Thatcher government deregulate the telecoms industry in the 1980s. In truth, no one knows what will happen until the reform is tried.

These heckles have unsettled some in the government. In the roster of its reforms, education has always taken pride of place, in particular the Swedish-style “free schools” intended to shake-up comprehensive education. Welfare reform comes next. Some think upheaval in the NHS would leave the government fighting on too many fronts at once—and that a battle royal with doctors and nurses is best avoided, given the resistance of other public-sector unions to the coming cuts.

That is to say nothing of the Liberal Democrats, the Tories’ coalition partners, who have already been bruised by rows over hikes to university-tuition fees and free schools, and whose grassroots are suspicious of Tory intentions on health. Oliver Letwin, the Cabinet Office minister and a trusted ally of Mr Cameron, has been drafted in by Number 10 to try to limit the ructions. That has led to tension in the inner Tory team over how uncompromising the reforms should be, with the “managerialists” arrayed against “true believers”.

Mr Lansley is a quietly spoken man with a big vision. But he needs more than a plausible bedside manner to reassure patients and professionals alike that his proposals will be therapeutic. He might well find himself compelled to alter the pace of his reforms, if not their scale.

Higher Order Inference (HOI)

Simple inference

Give 2 inferences, and get relevant evidence from the source.
Look at the question:
- What does this source tell you/show you (ISSUE)

Always look at issue AND guiding questions PLUS background information and put the source into context

Higher order inference

2 inferences with PURPOSE (hit highest level)
P – purpose
O – outcome
A – intended audience
R – Response/impact

action and reaction that the cartoonist/writer wants the audience to do/to have

the source wants audience to [key verb] [issue] and respond [in particular way]
the cartoonist/writer wants the [audience] to feel [key verb/adjective] [reiterate inference] so that [reaction from audience]

how to get intended audience – look at the provenance. put yourself in the shoes of the author/writer.

valid inference + evidence + intended audience + outcome

ALL LINKED!

Iraqi Defector admits lies of WMD

Defector admits to WMD lies that triggered Iraq war

• Man codenamed Curveball 'invented' tales of bioweapons
• Iraqi told lies to try to bring down Saddam Hussein regime
• Fabrications used by US as justification for invasion

Martin Chulov and Helen Pidd in Karlsruhe
guardian.co.uk,

The defector who convinced the White House that Iraq had a secret biological weapons programme has admitted for the first time that he lied about his story, then watched in shock as it was used to justify the war.

Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, codenamed Curveball by German and American intelligence officials who dealt with his claims, has told the Guardian that he fabricated tales of mobile bioweapons trucks and clandestine factories in an attempt to bring down the Saddam Hussein regime, from which he had fled in 1995.

"Maybe I was right, maybe I was not right," he said. "They gave me this chance. I had the chance to fabricate something to topple the regime. I and my sons are proud of that and we are proud that we were the reason to give Iraq the margin of democracy."

The admission comes just after the eighth anniversary of Colin Powell's speech to the United Nations in which the then-US secretary of state relied heavily on lies that Janabi had told the German secret service, the BND. It also follows the release of former defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld's memoirs, in which he admitted Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction programme.

The careers of both men were seriously damaged by their use of Janabi's claims, which he now says could have been – and were – discredited well before Powell's landmark speech to the UN on 5 February 2003.

The former CIA chief in Europe Tyler Drumheller describes Janabi's admission as "fascinating", and said the emergence of the truth "makes me feel better". "I think there are still a number of people who still thought there was something in that. Even now," said Drumheller.

In the only other at length interview Janabi has given he denied all knowledge of his supposed role in helping the US build a case for invading Saddam's Iraq.

In a series of meetings with the Guardian in Germany where he has been granted asylum, he said he had told a German official, who he identified as Dr Paul, about mobile bioweapons trucks throughout 2000. He said the BND had identified him as a Baghdad-trained chemical engineer and approached him shortly after 13 March of that year, looking for inside information about Saddam's Iraq.

"I had a problem with the Saddam regime," he said. "I wanted to get rid of him and now I had this chance."

He portrays the BND as gullible and so eager to tease details from him that they gave him a Perry's Chemical Engineering Handbook to help communicate. He still has the book in his small, rented flat in Karlsruhe, south-west Germany.

"They were asking me about pumps for filtration, how to make detergent after the reaction," he said. "Any engineer who studied in this field can explain or answer any question they asked."

Janabi claimed he was first exposed as a liar as early as mid-2000, when the BND travelled to a Gulf city, believed to be Dubai, to speak with his former boss at the Military Industries Commission in Iraq, Dr Bassil Latif.

The Guardian has learned separately that British intelligence officials were at that meeting, investigating a claim made by Janabi that Latif's son, who was studying in Britain, was procuring weapons for Saddam.

That claim was proven false, and Latif strongly denied Janabi's claim of mobile bioweapons trucks and another allegation that 12 people had died during an accident at a secret bioweapons facility in south-east Baghdad.

The German officials returned to confront him with Latif's version. "He says, 'There are no trucks,' and I say, 'OK, when [Latif says] there no trucks then [there are none],'" Janabi recalled.

He said the BND did not contact him again until the end of May 2002. But he said it soon became clear that he was still being taken seriously.

He claimed the officials gave him an incentive to speak by implying that his then pregnant Moroccan-born wife may not be able to travel from Spain to join him in Germany if he did not co-operate with them. "He says, you work with us or your wife and child go to Morocco."

The meetings continued throughout 2002 and it became apparent to Janabi that a case for war was being constructed. He said he was not asked again about the bioweapons trucks until a month before Powell's speech.

After the speech, Janabi said he called his handler at the BND and accused the secret service of breaking an agreement that they would not share anything he had told them with another country. He said he was told not to speak and placed in confinement for around 90 days.

With the US now leaving Iraq, Janabi said he was comfortable with what he did, despite the chaos of the past eight years and the civilian death toll in Iraq, which stands at more than 100,000.

"I tell you something when I hear anybody – not just in Iraq but in any war – [is] killed, I am very sad. But give me another solution. Can you give me another solution?

"Believe me, there was no other way to bring about freedom to Iraq. There were no other possibilities."

SS Ch3